Abstract Web interactions usually require the exchange of personal and confidential information for a variety of purposes, including enabling business transactions and the provisioning of services. A key issue affecting these interactions is the lack of trust and control on how data are going to be used and processed by the entities that receive it. In the traditional world, this problem is addressed using contractual agreements, those are signed by the involved parties, and law enforcement. This could be done electronically as well but, in addition to the trust issue, there is currently a major gap between the definition of legal contracts regulating the sharing of data, and the software infrastructure required to support and enforce them. How to enable organisations to provide more automation in this process? How to ensure that legal contracts can be actually enforced by the underlying IT infrastructure? How to enable end-users to express their preferences and constraints within these contracts? This article describes our R&D work to make progress towards addressing this gap via the usage of electronic Data Sharing Agreements (e-DSA). The aim is to share our vision, discuss the involved challenges and stimulate further research and development in this space. We specifically focus on a cloud scenario because it provides a rich set of use cases involving interactions and information sharing among multiple stakeholders, including users and service providers.
Introduction
Sharing data among groups of organizations and/or individuals (hereafter generally referred to as entities) is a key necessity in modern web-based society and at the very core of business transactions. However, data sharing possess several problems including trust, privacy, data misuse and/or abuse, and uncontrolled propagation of data. Often organizations use legal documents (contracts) to regulate the terms and conditions under which they agree to share data among themselves. A similar approach can be used when data are shared between a user and an organisation. A key problem, in the digital world, is that the constraints expressed in such contracts remain inaccessible from the software infrastructure supporting the data sharing and management processes. They still need to be interpreted and translated (primarily by humans) into meaningful technical policies and constraints, to ensure degrees of enforcement and auditing. What usually happens, when end-users data are going to be processed by organisations, is that end-users are asked to accept online a series of regulatory clauses on the terms of data processing, by simply clicking on a "Review and Accept the Terms and Conditions" button. Furthermore, end-users find difficult to understand these terms and conditions and how to express their potential preferences in terms of data sharing and handling.
This introduces burdens on users and usability issues of proposed solutions for end-to-end automation of contract definitions and their enforcement. Another key problem relates to trust. It is very complex to address. In general, there is no guarantee that contracts will be fulfilled and that potential violations will be promptly identified. Violation detections require verification of organisational practices, auditing and accountability frameworks. Furthermore, these contracts could evolve so they need continue adaptation, for example due to changes of provisioning of services, legislation, preferences, etc. This requires lifecycle management of contracts.
From a legal and technical perspective, initial work in these areas has been carried out in various R&D projects and initiatives, including W3C P3P (http://www.w3.org/P3P/), IBM EPAL work (http://www.zurich.ibm.com/pri/projects/ epal.html), the PRIME [1] , PrimeLife [2] , Consequence [3] and EnCoRe [4] collaborative projects. For example, mechanisms regulating end-users' privacy preferences on personal data, sticky policies, and external and auditing trust authorities have been introduced [5] to ensure that confidential data are protected (encrypted) during the sharing process, that access to data by organisations is constrained and subject to the fulfillment of specific management and enforcement steps, and degrees of assurance and accountability are provided.
In this paper, we primarily focus on the specific problem of how to provide more automation in the definition and enforcement of data sharing contracts, by involving both end-users (in the definition phase) and organisations (in their definition, enforcement, and monitoring phase). We believe this problem area is important to be addressed on its own, as it currently introduces constraints on end-users (and organizations), preventing them from having a wider adoption (and offer) of digital services. Here, we show the functionalities of the main components of an end-to-end e-DSA management infrastructure, as a proof of concept towards its concrete functioning.
Traditional legal contracts are written using natural language, which, from a technical point of view, is complex, difficult to parse, and prone to ambiguity. It is therefore extremely difficult to: -Systematically verify inconsistencies within a contract itself or between a contract and other pre-existing ones; -Automatically build a set of policies that can consistently enforce the terms and conditions expressed in a contract; -Relate violations of policies to the terms and conditions expressed in a contract.
There is, therefore, a gap between a traditional legal contract regulating the sharing of data and the software infrastructure supporting it. Our work, partially carried out during the EU Consequence project [3] , aims at making progress towards filling the gap through the usage of so-called electronic Data Sharing Agreements (e-DSA) and enforcing them, using privacy-aware enforcement frameworks developed in the UK EnCoRe collaborative project [4] .
e-DSA and e-DSA lifecycle An e-DSA is a human readable and machine processable contract regulating how organizations and/or individuals share data among themselves. It is essentially a multilateral agreement consisting of two parts:
-Predefined legal background information (which is usually available from a template, following, e.g., the textual template of traditional legal contracts); -Dynamically defined information including the definition of the validity period, the entities participating in the agreement, and, most importantly, the statements that constrain how data can be shared among entities (such statements usually include authorizations and obligations). Figure 1 shows the main phases of what we envisage to be an e-DSA lifecycle. When an end-user tries to access (1) a digital service-supplied by an organisation that requires the disclosure of personal information-an interaction with an e-DSA Management component (2) is triggered, to define a data sharing agreement (3), driven by available templates. This includes: an e-DSA authoring phase (4), where individuals edit the dynamic parts of the e-DSA, including authorizations and/or obligations statements. At organisation side, we imagine that the e-DSA is already filled with policies regulating the disclosure of the end-user personal information, according to internal regulations of the organisation and national privacy legislation. At end-user side, users will fill the e-DSA with their own preferences for preserving their data privacy; an e-DSA analysis phase (5), where verification tools identify possible conflicts between policies of the organisation and those of the end-user; an e-DSA deployment phase follows (6) where a set of enforceable policies are derived from the e-DSA and deployed (7) within the organisation IT infrastructure. The e-DSA enforcement mechanisms are used to ensure that requests to access and process confidential data happen consistently with the agreed e-DSA, both during the interactions with the service (8) and in other contexts, including attempts of employees and/or other applications to use the data and/or disclose it to third parties. We have currently developed the basic technologies that provide the building blocks to support the definition of e-DSA and their enforcement. We carried out initial validation of these technologies in a few case studies and we are currently integrating them in a demonstrator for a cloud scenario, as a proof of concept, to illustrate our vision and open issues, and to stimulate further research and development in this space. The remaining part of this article provides an overview of our work, an assessment of current issues, and future steps.
Roadmap Next section introduces the cloud scenario. Sections 3 and 4 present the design and prototype implementation of an authoring tool and an analyzer for the definition of e-DSA. Sections 5 and 6 detail e-DSA deployment and enforcement via the EnCoRe framework. In Sect. 7, we revise related work in the area of controlled data sharing. Finally, Sect. 8 concludes the paper.
Cloud scenario
We consider a cloud computing scenario as a significant context where to leverage e-DSA, their definition and their enforcement. The e-DSA and their automated enforcement are key to further enable business interactions and information flows within the Cloud, by providing additional assurance and control on data to both users and businesses. Figure 2 shows an example of involved players in the Cloud and related information flows.
In this scenario, multiple Cloud Service Providers (CSP) are available in the Internet. A customer uses the services supplied by a specific CSP to access online travelling, printing, office applications, etc. To access these services, customers need to register and disclose personal data, inclusive of address, financial details, etc. A CSP might need to interact with other Service Providers to provide the required functionalities and share relevant data to enable the business transaction. For example, a travelling service might need to interact with an external billing service and flight reservation service to supply the required service to the customer.
In all these interactions, personal and confidential data need to be gathered; it is analysed, processed and exchanged with other parties. To avoid losing control on how data are used, who can access it, etc., the entities that disclose information would like to express preferences (including privacy preferences) on how their personal and confidential data should be handled along with authorization and obligation constraints. Some specific examples of authorization, prohibition, and obligation policies follow. The policies are related to a generic customer called Alice.
-Authorization policies:
-Data of Alice's credit card can be accessed by Service Provider 1 (SP1) only for Business Transaction purposes; -Alice's email address can be shared with SP2 and SP3 only for business transaction and goods delivery purposes.
-Prohibition policies:
-Alice's credit card details cannot be shared with SP4.
-Obligation policies:
-Alice wants to be notified by email every time her data is accessed; -Alice wants to be notified every time her credit card is disclosed to another Service Provider; Interestingly, the stated constraints might need to be enforced by all the entities involved in a chain of data disclosures, e.g., in the example, by the Travelling Service, the CRM Service, etc. Furthermore, the customer might, over time, change their minds and modify some of their preferences and constraints. These changes should be propagated through the chain of information disclosures as well.
It is worth noticing that the non-expert user could introduce inconsistencies in their preferences. For example, Alice could ask for the Travelling Service (that would need some of Alice's data for processing), while, at the same time, denies the access to each kind of her data. This highlights the need for consistency verification of the set of policies defined in a e-DSA, as clarified in the following in Sect. 4 .
Finally, in the above example policies, the identifiers of the service providers (i.e., SP1, SP2, and SP3) are just illustrative. When the end-user asks to access a digital service, and the e-DSA Management component is triggered, the electronic form for e-DSA authoring will show appropriate terms for the service being provided (see Sect. 3 for more details). Thus, SP1 could be, for example, the name of the provider whose service the end-user is trying to access, and SP2, SP3 the name of the service providers that usually collaborate with SP1. For instance, SP1 could be the name of the Travelling Service, while SP2 the Flight Reservation Service SP1 usually collaborates with.
In this context, we believe that management services to define e-DSA, coupled with enforcement mechanisms, provide a key contribution in capturing constraints and ensuring that they are fulfilled at the IT and operational levels.
As shown in Fig. 3 , a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) can provide the e-DSA Management Service to enable users (and/or other entities) to define their e-DSA, based on available templates. The CSP can use enforcement frameworks, such as the one defined in EnCoRe [4] , to deploy and enforce agreed e-DSA. This approach can be applied to a community of service providers: the disclosure of confidential data and a related e-DSA from a CSP to another CSP will ensure that the receiving CSP will also be able to deploy and enforce the agreed e-DSA and/or a variant of it (agreed with the sharing CSP).
Our current work provides the basic tools and capabilities to:
1. Enable end-users (customers) and organisations to jointly define simple e-DSA and related constraints, by means of wizards/editors; 2. Deploy mechanisms within organisations to define and enforce e-DSA; 3. Deploy mechanisms within organisations to agree and share e-DSA with third parties when disclosing personal and confidential data; 4. Enable users to update e-DSA and propagate changes to the various points where data have been disclosed.
To achieve this, we leveraged the work carried out in the Consequence Project [3] to further develop an e-DSA Management Service, to enable organisation to support the Authoring, Verification of e-DSA. We also leveraged and extended the services and mechanisms developed in the UK EnCoRe collaborative project [4] (EnCoRe Toolbox) to deploy and enforce e-DSA, i.e., map e-DSA policies into enforceable policies within an organisation (or Service Provider) and further handle the process involving the disclosure of data (and e-DSA) to third parties. Specifically, the EnCoRe toolbox can be used to manage and enforce e-DSA policies and support the tracking of data whereabouts (once disclosed between multiple entities). EnCoRe can handle the propagation of relevant policy constraints (and preferences) to third parties, along with the disclosed data. In this context, it supports the propagation of e-DSA and their updates between the involved parties.
In the current work, we assume that each Service Provider deploys their own implementation of both the e-DSA Management Service and the EnCoRe enforcement framework, integrated with their back-end services. The remaining part of the article provides additional details about the core technologies underpinning e-DSA authoring, their analysis and their enforcement. We highlight current challenges and opportunities for additional R&D work.
e-DSA authoring
As introduced in Sect. 1, when an end-user tries to access some digital service, the e-DSA Management component is triggered, whose first step is the phase of e-DSA Authoring (see Figs. 4 and 5) . We envisage a plurality of end-users, that goes from those simply accepting the policies for data processing defined at organisation side to those aiming at a deeper control on how their data are processed. The authoring tool presented in this section allows the most demanding users to customise their preferences on data processing, while the "easy-going" users can, however, achieve a more explicit version of the whole agreement, than the often obscure version offered by the traditional series of textual, contractual rules. From the analysis of textual DSA samples, we have derived a generic structure for e-DSA, consisting of various parts, among which a Title, a validity Period, the list of Data covered by the agreement, the list of involved Parties, that can be both a single user or an organization, their respective Signatures, and (possibly empty) Authorizations, Prohibitions, and Obligations sections. The proposed authoring tool is focused on the editing of Authorizations, Prohibitions, and Obligations sections in a human understandable way. Such policies are edited by referring to data and involve parties specified in the Data and Parties sections of the e-DSA respectively. Although the definition of the Data and Parties sections is out of scope for this work, we remark that data items and parties are referred to using unique identifiers (possibly a URI), and that data types, and related attributes, like, e.g., author, size, creation date, ... are defined in formal customizable vocabularies (also named ontologies).
We developed an initial prototype of e-DSA Editor, a lightweight Web-based application allowing users to edit an e-DSA using a controlled natural language (CNL4DSA [6] ). Our Web-based Editor aims at simplifying the creation and modification of an e-DSA by non-technical users, and, at the same time, producing the formal representation of the e-DSA content, thus enabling its automated processing. The controlled natural language is used for the authoring of authorization, prohibition, and obligation statements. Figure 4 illustrates the high-level architecture of the prototype of e-DSA editor. The front-end layer is a lightweight Web 2.0 application, based on AJAX techniques, enabling interactive editing of an e-DSA. The front-end layer relies on the application service layer for accessing e-DSA data and related vocabulary. Indeed, part of an e-DSA is an external customizable vocabulary that defines the set of terms, actions and predicates that users can combine to build statements. The storage abstraction layer decouples the application from the actual storage systems (filesystem or database or content management systems, etc.) that is used for storing e-DSA and vocabularies. The tool displays the predefined legal background information from one of the available templates, and allows the user to interactively fill in the dynamic information of the e-DSA, and particularly the authorization and obligation statements. Note that both the organisations and the endusers (customers) are expected to use the authoring tool. As a temporal sequence, we expect that the organisations fill their parts of authorisations, prohibitions, and obligations (according to their internal regulations and National privacy directives), and then the customer can set her privacy preferences on her data disclosure. On the other hand, the language remains open with respect to the actual terms used to build the statements. Such terms are domain-specific and are taken from an external vocabulary, which is defined by a formal ontology. The ontology is defined through the Protégé open-source ontology editor (http://protege.stanford.edu/). By exploiting the ontological relationships, the editor can also ensure semantic correctness of the statements. The editor can also exploit concept hierarchies in the ontology defining the vocabulary to automatically expand statements that contain implicit meaning (for example, generic concepts are automatically replaced by a disjunction of their most specialized subclasses).
The following is an example of the kind of policies that it is possible to edit with the e-DSA Editor:
IF data has category "credit card details" AND a provider has identifier "SP1" AND that data has purpose "business transaction" THEN that provider CAN access that data
The above authorization is the CNL4DSA version of the first authorization listed in the Sect. 2.
In the screenshot shown in Fig. 5 , the user is editing a new authorization; the list of available vocabulary terms is displayed in a pop-up window ("available choices"). When authoring a statement, the user can also make references to previously used terms (in the same or other statements). For example, in the previous authorization, the expression "that data" is a reference to the term "data" appearing at the beginning ("IF data …"). The e-DSA Editor enables the creation of references with a simple point-and-click mechanism (the user points to the term that she wants to refer to, and the reference is automatically created). Additionally, the e-DSA Editor can highlight references in the various statements, thus showing the implicit interconnections.
The final result produced by the authoring tool is an e-DSA, saved as XML, and it contains both the English version and the CNL4DSA version of the authorizations, prohibitions, and obligations.
It is worth noticing that the editing phase is driven by the tool that shows to the editor only the set of available terms taken from a predefined ontology. Ontologies are domainspecific and the organisations are in charge of define them. Furthermore, the available terms are selected taken into account the nature of the policy that the author is composing, e.g., if the author has selected the predicate "has category", the tool will then show terms referred to data and it does not show terms related to, e.g., subjects or actions, since "has category" is a predicate for data.
e-DSA analysis
Even if the e-DSA authoring is simplified by the pre-defined ontology, and so a predefined set of specific terms which to choose from, policies are composed both by policy makers at organisations and by end-users. This could cause the presence of conflicting policies among the policy set edited through the authoring tool (either because the policies written by the end-users are in contradiction with each others, or because they conflict with the policies written by the policy makers at organisations). Two, or more, policies are conflicting when they oppositely evaluate with respect to the same access request (i.e., one policy allows the request, while the other denies it). Thus, the e-DSA lifecycle provides an e-DSA analysis phase, where the policies edited in the authoring phase are checked to search possible conflicts. The sequence "authoring-analysis" is supposed to be iterative: authoring is followed by policy analysis, and, in case of existence of conflicts, the authoring is needed again to reconsider the policies. There could be also the case that, in case of conflict detection, the organisations do not want to re-consider their policies (either for legislation constraints, or business purposes). In any case, the end-user should be made aware of the detected discrepancy between her preferences and the constraints in force at organisation side.
The main goal of the e-DSA Analyser is to detect conflicts between policies. However, through the analyser it is also possible to answer specific questions related to single policies and visualize a table of access:
-Conflict detection the tool checks if a set of policies is conflict-free. In particular, conflicts are searched either between an authorization and a prohibition clause or between an obligation and a prohibition clause. The tool does not check conflicts between an authorization and an obligation because we are assuming that any obliged action is implicitly authorized. -Questions related to single queries The tool answers specific questions regarding authorizations, obligations, and prohibitions, like "is it true that subject x is authorised to perform action z on object y, under a set of contextual conditions?" - Table of access This table shows all the actions authorised by a set of policies, under a set of contextual conditions.
In the scenario discussed in this paper, we envisage that policy makers and policy experts at organisations (supporting e-DSA management) will use this tool to carry out the validation of draft e-DSA before carrying on with the other steps. In particular, by querying the tool with a specific question, the policy maker can be assured that the set of policies guarantees indeed certain rights on data, and denies others. Moreover, the table of accesses is a quick way to visualise all the actions permitted by the set of policies over a set of data, being performed by a set of subjects. This gives a global and fast vision of the authorisations enabled by the policies. The noticeable aspect of the tool is that policy makers/experts can check the presence of conflicts in an automatic way. Either the e-DSA is accepted (in case of no conflicts) or suitable feedback is provided for resolution of conflicts. The primary feedback is an alert message advising that a conflict exists (see the following analysis example and Fig. 8) . Secondarily, the issue is how to solve the detected conflict. Conflict resolution strategies are outside the scope of this paper. However, in Sect. 7, we give details of possible conflict resolutions strategies and automatic prototype implementations of these strategies. The e-DSA Analyser consists of two parts:
-The formal engine Maude [7] that actually performs the analysis of the policies; -A graphical user interface that allows the user to dynamically load contextual conditions and queries for the analysis of a set of policies.
The engine. CNL4DSA has been designed with a precise formal semantics, based on a modal labelled transition system [8] . Thus, the language is governed by rules regulating states and transitions between these states. This allows for a precise translation of CNL4DSA in Maude. Maude is an executable programming language that models distributed systems and the actions within those systems [7] . Systems are specified by defining algebraic data types axiomatizing system's states, and rewrite rules declaring the relationships between the states and the transitions between them. Maude is executable and comes with a built in toolkit that allows formal reasoning about the specifications produced. In particular, the Maude toolkit can be exploited to search for allowed traces, i.e., sequence of actions, of a policy specified in CNL4DSA. These traces represent the sequences of actions that are authorised, or required, or denied by the policy.
CNL4DSA has been made executable by translating its syntax and formal semantics in Maude. The Maude template used for the analysis of the policies is available at: http:// www.iit.cnr.it/staff/marinella.petrocchi/template.maude. This template contains static parts defining the translation from CNL4DSA to Maude and logic operators. Also, some modules are dynamically loaded depending on the kind of policies, contextual conditions, and queries that the user is going to deal with.
The graphical user interface. The GUI is deployed as a Web Application. It enables the user (in our scenario, the policy experts at organisations) to query the analysis engine and visualize its results. The analysis engine exposes its functionalities as Web Service methods. The GUI is in charge of retrieving the set of policies that the policy expert wants to analyze and the related vocabulary from a repository. Both the set of policies and the vocabulary are defined by means of the e-DSA Editor. The expert can create dynamic contexts that represent the environment under which the analysis will be performed. As an example, a possible context could be: the category of data which the analysis is interested in "credit card details"; the identifier of the service provider is "SP4"; and the purpose of access which the analysis is interested in "Business Transaction". Figure 6 shows a phase of the selection of some contextual conditions. It is worth noticing that, in our implementation, the selected contexts are set to true, and we assume that everything that is not explicitly specified does not hold. Hence, the analyst shall select each context that is supposed to be true.
Once defining the context, the analyst has three possibilities, as anticipated above. Either she can ask for conflict detection, or she can compose a query and perform successive elaboration on it, or she can ask for the table of access. Figure 7 shows a query composition, in which the analyst is composing a query related to an obligation: by composing the query shown in the figure, and launching the successive analysis, the question of the analysis is if it is true that, among the policies set under investigation, a policy exists such that, after that the provider has accessed the data, then the user must be notified by email about this access. The analysis will instantiate the question with the defined con- The GUI sends all the inputs, i.e., the vocabulary, the CNL4DSA description of the policies, the context and the queries to Maude, which performs the analysis. Finally, the results are shown. As an example, Fig. 8 shows the conflict detected by the analyser when considering the following simple authorization and prohibition policies: -Alice's credit card data can be shared with SP3 and SP4 for business transaction purposes; -Alice's credit card data cannot be shared with SP4.
These two policies give and deny to SP4 the possibility of accessing the credit card data of Alice. In particular, the authorisation could have been set, at organisation side, through the e-DSA authoring tool while the prohibition could have been set by Alice, at end-user side, through the same authoring tool.
When the following contextual conditions are set:
-datum has data category "credit card"; -provider is "SP4"; -datum has purpose "business transaction"; both the authorization and the prohibition are enacted. The alert message in Fig. 8 is then shown to the analyst. The analysis result gives a clue of inconsistency among the policies in the e-DSA. At this point, we envisage that the analyst will run one of the existing automatic methodologies for solving conflicts among access control policies. In the Related Work section, we will discuss some of these approaches, that can be conveniently adapted and be integrated in the e-DSA analyser, to automatically solve conflicts once spotted.
The main challenge in our analysis approach is about usability and the potential complexity for common users in fully understanding the results it provides. This is the reason why we envisage that the system could be used by trained personnel in the organisations (such as policy makers and policy experts), whilst end-users will be only exposed to simple, high-level information highlighting potential issues and ways to solve them. We believe that the validation of e-DSA, the identification of conflicts and issues and the process of conveying information to different stakeholders in a suitable way are key research areas that require further investigation.
Upon e-DSA authoring and analysis, e-DSA are deployed and enforced by organizations. In the following section, we discuss the technical capabilities of the EnCoRe framework [4] and how it can be leveraged for the deployment and enforcement of e-DSA policies within and across organisations.
EnCoRe policy enforcement framework
EnCoRe [4, 9] is a UK collaborative project that involves contributors from the social, legal, and technological areas. EnCoRe provides user-friendly and reliable privacy management capabilities to individuals and organisations. Specifically, EnCoRe provides data subjects (users) with better control on their personal data once disclosed to organisations, by enabling them to provide privacy preferences on how data should be handled. Data subjects can subsequently change these preferences. EnCoRe enables organisations to fully enforce these preferences, along with security and privacy policies, which include authorization, obligation, and prohibition policies. The EnCoRe technical capabilities are described in full details in the EnCoRe D2.3 Technical Archi- tecture [4] . These capabilities are provided by a related EnCoRe toolbox. Figure 9 shows its key, privacy & data management capabilities that can be deployed within and across organisations.
As shown in Fig. 9 , EnCoRe includes several mechanisms, as (1) to capture end-users' privacy choices via explicit privacy preferences, (2) deploy and enforce them within the organisation via privacy-aware access control and obligation management modules (driven by configurable policies), (3)(6) tracking data whereabouts and providing controlled disclosure of data via the sticky policies mechanism [5] , and (4) auditing and logging the various activities involving data handling and disclosures. Furthermore, EnCoRe enables end-users to subsequently change their choice and supports the propagation of changes across all the involved entities (e.g., organisations where data have been disclosed to) (5) .
End-users' preferences can potentially include purposes for which data could be used, criteria about which third parties could get access these data, various obligations (e.g., about notification, deletion, etc.). They are mapped into enforceable policies in the back-end EnCoRe access control and obligation management components, driven by policies.
The "EnCoRe Toolbox" term refers to the set of technical capabilities provided by EnCoRe. Figure 10 shows the high-level EnCoRe Technical Architecture underpinning this toolbox and maps the EnCoRe capabilities to its various architectural components [4] . The EnCoRe technical components have been designed and implemented as independent, configurable services: they support secure communication and audit/logging capabilities. Specifically they support four common use cases [4] , that animate the components shown in Fig. 10: -An end-user discloses personal data along with privacy preferences: the information is sent to the EnCoRe backend Consent & Revocation Provisioning component for internal configuration (via policies and the data registry, to track data whereabouts). This includes setting Privacy Obligations in the Privacy Obligation Manager; -Employees and/or applications trying to access data for specific purposes (e.g., marketing, transaction processing, research, etc.): the Privacy-aware Access Control module intercepts these requests (via SQL interception and/or specific interception points within applications) and grants/denies access based on the evaluation of authorization policies. Of course these technical capabilities do not address the case of fraudulent Service Providers that might just bypass EnCoRe controls or not deploy them at all. The EnCoRe work provides additional capabilities in terms of compliance and auditing [9] to determine the principles that organisations need to fulfill to be EnCoRe compliant as well as the criteria for monitoring and auditing; -End-user changes his privacy preferences: EnCoRe enable end-users to monitor the status of their data and if their preferences have been fulfilled (e.g., in terms of notifications, data deletion, etc.). The end-user can change, at any time, their privacy preferences. This triggers a chain of updates of stored privacy preferences within the organisation. If the related data were shared with third parties, these parties will also receive update notifications (by leveraging the Data Registry component); -Personal data are disclosed to a third party: the system intercepts the attempt of applications to disclose data to third parties (via locally deployed agents). Personal data are disclosed to the third party via the external workflow manager, using the sticky policy mechanisms that bundle data to policies and privacy preferences [5] . The data registry is updated.
The EnCoRe technical solution, developed in the course (4 years) of the EnCoRe project, has been tested and refined in the context of 3 case studies, involving: Enterprise Data; a Biobanking organisation; the UK government's Identity Assurance Programme. A final implementation of the EnCoRe technical solution is currently available [4] . These case studies provided confidence that the EnCoRe solution can be integrated with state-of-the-art enterprise back-end solutions, in particular Identity Management and User Provisioning/Deprovisioning solutions. Of course, the actual integration complexity depends on the specific situation, for example due to the presence of legacy situations. We explored workarounds using solution and API wrappers in two case studies.
We believe EnCoRe provides a suitable framework to map e-DSA constraints (including authorizations and obligations) into enforceable and monitorable policies within and across organisations. More details follow. The EnCoRe architecture implements explicit capabilities to handle (privacy-aware) authorization policies for access control and obligation policies. These policies [4] can be flexibly defined and extended. In this context, we envisage using the EnCoRe framework to support the management of the e-DSA policies in a way that can be enforced and monitored. Specifically, we explored how to translate the e-DSA authorization, prohibition, and obligation constraints into an internal programmatic XML representation, that captures the various e-DSA conditions along with references to data items. This includes constraints that dictate:
-agreed purposes for accessing and disclosing data; -which entities can/cannot access the data and or data can/cannot be disclosed to (access control constraints); -deletion, notification, data minimisation, etc. activities (obligation constraints).
EnCoRe authorization policies are compatible with (and similar to) XACML access control policies [10]: for brevity, we omit their description. Details are available [4] . These policies have been extended to take into account e-DSA constraints including checking the requesters' purpose for accessing/disclosing data, whitelisting and blacklisting of potential data receivers, etc. At the enforcement time, EnCoRe detects when end-users' data are accessed (via interception points, such as SW function wrappers or SQL interception) and policies are enforced. This obligation policy is an internal representation of the following e-DSA obligation: "Notify Alice by email every time her data is accessed".
At the enforcement time, EnCoRe detects when end-users' data are accessed and sends notifications to data subjects, if they required to do it (based on their preferences). A detailed description of the representation of EnCoRe policies and their enforcement capabilities is available [4] . The next section provides additional details about our current work to leverage the EnCoRe framework for the deployment and enforcement of e-DSA, along with existing open issues.
e-DSA Deployment and enforcement via EnCoRe
The deployment and enforcement of e-DSA within organisations is a complex task. This includes the deployment of the various e-DSA management components within a Service Provider, their integration with existing Security, Identity Management, and business components. The entire process involving the authoring, validation, deployment and enforcement of e-DSA can be achieved in practice, as follows. Data subjects (users), at the time of disclosing their personal data and preferences, engage in the definition of e-DSA by means of e-DSA management services provided by the Service Providers. Each Service Provider may provide a domain specific vocabulary of terms that can be used within the controlled natural language used by the e-DSA Editor.
The resulting e-DSA, once validated by the e-DSA Analyser, contain references to the relevant types of data items to be disclosed and the agreed policies. These policies reflect, among other things, the (privacy) preferences expressed by the user. As shown in Fig. 9b ), users disclose their personal data along with the generated e-DSA, using the user side EnCoRe web plug-in. This information is intercepted by the EnCoRe Consent & Revocation Provisioning Component (integrated within the Service Provider back-end solutions). This component analyses the content of the e-DSA. It stores the data in the Service Provider Data Repository whilst the extracted preferences and the e-DSA are stored in the EnCoRe Data Registry (along with a reference to the actual data). Furthermore, it extracts the policies from the e-DSA, maps them into the EnCoRe internal representation of authorisation and obligation policies (1-1 mapping) and deploys them respectively in the EnCoRe Privacy-aware Access Control and Obligation Management components. Access to data is regulated by the EnCoRe Access Control component driven by the policies and the specific user preferences (contained in the e-DSA). The Obligation Management component deals with involved duties, such as sending notifications, deleting or minimising data, etc. As previously discussed in the four general use cases, the EnCoRe framework supports changes made by users to the e-DSA and related policies and preferences. These changes are reflected in the entire chain of data disclosures via a sequence of update requests and local updates of the configuration of EnCoRe internal systems. EnCoRe also deals with the steps involved with the sharing of data with third parties.
Whilst the work done in EnCoRe shows the technical feasibility of mapping e-DSA into enforceable policies and its integration with organisation's back-end services, additional work has to be done on the overall trust and accountability issues. This is a general problem, beyond e-DSA management, as it is about how to provide trust and accountability on personal and confidential data once disclosed to third parties. Initial accountability work has been carried out by HP Labs in their sticky policies work [5] . Additional work has been carried out in EnCoRe in terms of exploring compliance and auditing mechanisms. However, trust and accountability are still open issues: these areas provide key opportunities for further R&D work. More R&D work is required in the overall lifecycle management of e-DSA contracts, due to changes of organisation business and supply chains. For example, changes in the supply of services and reliance on specific SPs might require the revision of e-DSA, contractual agreements, etc.
Related work
Controlled data protection and sharing in cloud environments currently present challenging open issues. This is testified by pretty new research efforts, as, e.g., A4Cloud [11] (Accountability for the Cloud, a 4-year EU FP7 funded project started in late 2012) whose main scope is to "increase trust in cloud computing by devising methods and tools, through which cloud stakeholders can be made accountable for the privacy and confidentiality of information held in the cloud. These methods and tools will combine risk analysis, policy enforcement, monitoring and compliance auditing". Also, we mention here the newborn EU FP7 funded project CoCoCloud [12] (Confidential and Compliant Cloud, a 3-year collaborative project, started in November, 2013). The project aims to facilitate data sharing in the Cloud, by providing end-to-end data centric security from the client to the cloud, based on the (semi-) automated enforcement of Data Sharing Agreements. Both projects have an eye to technical and legal solutions for corporate and personal data processed in cloud service provision ecosystems. The CoCo-Cloud project specifically focuses on the automatic management of Data Sharing Agreements.
In this paper, we mainly deal with technological solutions enabling such automatic management (to the consistent definition of the electronic agreement, to its deployment at enforcement at organisation side). However, the use of Cloud Computing technologies intersects with the law in areas like data protection and sharing [13] . In cases where personal data are processed, legal obligations under European data protection laws are applicable [14] . Location and treatment of data remain relevant where data protection laws impose restrictions on the processing of personal data [15] . A current practice in Cloud deployment involves the creation of "onesize-fits-all" agreements [16] . This raises many novel legal questions [17] as well as the non-compliance of even the most standardized Cloud Computing models with national laws [18] . Enabling cloud models preserving privacy of data by maintaining compliance with regulatory norms and Law is a fascinating ground open to investigation.
Here, we focus on technical approaches, and we revise related work in the area of controlled data sharing and management, by primarily focusing on authoring and analysis of data sharing policies. Also, we highlight novelties, in our vision of an integrated approach, with respect to past projects, i.e., PRIME, PrimeLife, Consequence, and Encore itself.
Policy authoring. Series of work in [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] connect policy authoring tools with the capability of common users to use them. In [19] , the authors carry out a laboratory evaluation of a variety of user-centric methods for privacy policies authoring, to identify which design decisions should be taken for flexible and usable privacy enabling techniques. Work in [20] continues this line of research, by providing a parser which identifies the privacy policy elements in rules entered in natural languages: identification of such elements is a key step for subsequent translation of natural sentences in enforceable constructs (such as the XACML language [10]). Authors of [21] recall security and privacy policy-authoring tasks in general, and discover further usability challenges that policy authoring presents. In [22] , the authors present the Coalition Policy Management Portal for policies authoring, verification, and deployment, with the goal of providing "easy to use mechanisms for refining high-level userspecified goals into low-level controls". These works show an implementation of a prototype architecture called SPAR-CLE (Server Privacy Architecture and Capability Enablement). This aims at helping privacy professionals to create policies in natural language and translate those into system readable commands. The interface is designed for a desktop usage that provides a syntax guide for writing policies in natural language. Work in [23] advances the notion of templatesbased authoring tools, for users with different roles and skill sets, as, e.g., vendors, service providers, end-users, and IT administrators. Thus, the authors propose different templates to edit privacy policies, each of them needing different user skills, and they model a prototype interface, still not implemented. From a business perspective, Axiomatics offers a desktop interface for policy authoring [24] . The GUI provides support to IT administrators to edit XACML policies. Although such supporting features drive the policy makers to come up with correct machine readable policies, relevant technical skills are needed to manage the tool. From a social networking perspective, work in [25] presents a collaborative authoring tool, allowing several individuals to specify policies over data published on social networks, and whose disclosure may affect their privacy. The authors acknowledge some usability issues in their prototype implementation, and future work are foreseen towards a user-friendly authoring interface. The proposed tool approaches the problem from a different prospective. Indeed, the interface allows users to write policies on own data by the setting of an authorization to other users and without involving their data (data centric model). Furthermore, different entities that specify policies on a same data are unaware of the existence of policies written by others. All the policies are analyzed at run-time after each access request to the data.
Achievements and ongoing work on the authoring tool
The authoring tool presented in Sect. 3 has the peculiarity to edit e-DSA, the electronic version of traditional textual data sharing agreements. These agreements consist of different informative fields, such as, e.g., the kind of data covered by the agreement, the involved parties, the validity of the agreement, the data sharing policies over data, etc. The e-DSA are authored through a graphical interface that truthfully recreates the original fields. The author is guided by drop-down menus offering choices within a pre-defined ontology that is specific of the domain of the organisations that are offering a digital services to the end-users. We conducted an usability study of our initial prototype of the e-DSA Editor with a team of external evaluators, including both engineers and managers (such a study has been carried out during the FP7 European Project Consequence [3] ). The evaluators suggested many improvements related to both the user interaction and the user interface. However, the evaluators also recognized the value of the approach. In terms of the controlled natural language used in the e-DSA Editor, the evaluators provided additional feedback about extending its expressiveness. We are taking this feedback into account while evolving our current prototype implementation towards a more user-friendly editing and the use of a complete natural language (see, e.g., work in [26] ). Closing, we believe that there are key R&D opportunities in the space of e-DSA authoring in terms of how to create suitable wizards to simplify the overall e-DSA management process and build GUIs that are simple to use to a broad set of end-users.
Policy analysis. Data protection policy analysis is essential to detect inconsistencies and conflicts before the enforcement of policies actual. The e-DSA Analyser presented in Sect. 4 builds on research results developed in [27] [28] [29] and it exploits the controlled language CNL4DSA [6] to perform formal analysis of the policy clauses. In the various work, different scenarios have been taken into account, from e-Health to Business and Industry. In [30] , it is shown that the Event-B language (http://www.event-b.org) can be used to model obliged events. The Rodin platform provides animation and model checking toolset for analyzing specifications written in Event-B, thus leading to capability of obligations analysis [31] . The authors of [32] propose a comprehensive framework for expressing highly complex privacyrelated policies, featuring purposes and obligations. Also, a formal definition of conflicting permission assignments is given, together with efficient conflict-checking algorithms. The Policy Design Tool [33] offers a sophisticated way for modeling and analysing high-level security requirements in a business context and create security policy templates in a standard format. There exists also generic formal approaches that could exploit a priori for the analysis of some aspects of data protection policies. As an example, the Klaim family of process calculi [34] provides a high-level model for distributed systems, and, in particular, exploits a capabilitybased type system for programming and controlling access and usage of resources. Finally, work in [35] exploits a static analyzer for a variant of Klaim.
Policy conflict detection is generally followed by resolutions of conflicts. Not necessarily tied to data protection, existing work concerns general conflict resolution methods for access control in various areas. The approach adopted by the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [10] is a very general one and defines standard rule-combining algorithms: Deny-Overrides, PermitOverrides, First-Applicable, and Only-One-Applicable. As an example, the Deny-Overrides algorithm states that the result of the policy is Deny if the evaluation of at least one of the rules returns Deny. A classification of anomalies that may occur among firewall policies is presented in [36] . In the same work, an editing tool allows a user to insert, modify, and remove policy rules to avoid anomalies. Also, work in [37] proposes methods for preventing policy conflicts, more than a strategy for solving them when they occur. Both work in [38] and [39] focus on conflict resolution strategies for data protection policies within e-health scenarios. In [38] , the authors suggest a resolution strategy based on high level features of the policy as a whole (such as the recency of a policy). If such characteristics are not sufficient for deciding which policy should be applied, the default deny approach is applied. With respect to that solution, the approach in [39] aims at defining a finer grained strategy, based on a finer definition of the policy specificity. In particular, it firstly evaluates the specificity of the policy in identifying each element, namely: subject, object, action and environment. Then, it combines these values through a weighted sum, that allows the authors to assign more relevance to the specificity of the definition of one of the policy element with respect to the others (e.g., we could choose that the specificity in defining the subject is 2 times more relevant than the specificity in defining the object). This strategy has been implemented in [40] . This work presents a running prototype, based on the XACML engine, that implements the resolution strategy based on the policy specificity as an extension to the standard XACML combining algorithms. Experimental results show the prototype to be efficient in terms of execution time, on a variable number of conflicting policies.
Achievements and ongoing work on the analysis tool
The analysis tool presented in Sect. 4 is specifically tailored to analyse e-DSA clauses and spot conflicts that may exist among authorisations and prohibitions (or among obligations and prohibitions). These clauses are thought to be edited through the authoring tool presented in Sect. 3. Thus, our attempt is towards enabling an interactive and mostly automatic e-DSA generation phase. Even if not relying on such a lifecycle (i.e., they have not an associated policy editor), works in [30, 31] follow an approach similar to ours, since they focus on the analysis of data protection policies exploiting formal tools. The main difference with our approach is the nature of the specification language that is input to the analyser. Indeed, the Maude specification language (as well as other languages based on rewriting logics) puts the accent on execution traces, by focusing on which allowed, forbidden, or obliged actions are performed (or not) by system runs. On the other hand, Event-B specifies properties on the state of a system more than ones on the system transitions. This difference leads to use different analysis methodologies: the former work analyses execution traces of the system, while the latter configuration states. However, the two works are pretty similar (their results have been achieved within the same research project and almost simultaneously).
Following the suggestions of the Consequence evaluators, we added an help on line facility in the current version of the analysis tool, to mitigate usability issues. Similarly to what discussed regarding policy authoring, we believe that there are open challenges in the space of e-DSA analysis, e.g., in terms of how to integrate efficient conflict solvers in the e-DSA analyser and give also non-expert users the flavour of the nature of conflicts and of the adopted solutions, to go further towards the e-DSA deployment and enforcement phases.
Comparisons with past collaborative projects. Relevant related work on the management, deployment, and enforcement of privacy policies has been carried out in the recent past, as testified, e.g., by the research results of the following key collaborative projects: PRIME [1] , PrimeLife [2] , EnCoRe [4] , and Consequence [3] . PRIME and PrimeLife specify a wide range of policies (including authorizations, obligations and data handling policies) along with enforcement mechanisms: however, these policies are often created and managed by organisations. It was beyond the key objectives of these projects to provide advanced tools and GUI to author and check for policy consistency through analysers. Solutions developed in these projects allow users to provide their privacy preferences (along with degrees of preferences' revocation, in EnCoRe) that, however, would be used within organisational-driven policies, for enforcement and monitoring purposes. The EnCoRe architecture implements explicit capabilities to handle privacy preferences (as authorisation and obligation policies). Thus, we envisage the EnCoRe policy deployment and enforcement framework to be able to work with e-DSA: Sect. 6 has provided details on how e-DSA definition (authoring and analysis) and EnCoRe policy deployment and enforcement framework can co-exist in a synergistic way, and how the two phases can conveniently complement one another. In particular, we think that (1) the user's privacy preferences can be indeed encoded, through the authoring tool, in the e-DSA template; (2) a consistency check over the e-DSA can be applied through the analysis phase; and (3) the EnCoRe deployment and enforcement framework can be applied to a conflict-free e-DSA. EnCoRe complements the generation of e-DSA, by enforcing the e-DSA policies.
One of the main goals of Consequence was to provide an infrastructure for e-DSA, supporting the (semi)-automatic generation of the agreements (authoring + analysis). The technical descriptions of the authoring tool and the analysis tool can be found in [41] . The main differences between what we propose here and what has been done in Consequence are that (1) the definition of e-DSA was driven only by organisations, without a "multi-stakeholder" handshake; and (2) distributed scenarios such as the Cloud were not addressed. As testified by really recent European initiatives (e.g., the newborn EU project CoCo-Cloud [12] , the adoption of e-DSA for facilitating data sharing in cloud scenarios is a challenging issue that is worth to be addressed. With the current work, we shed light to the building blocks of a possible endto-end data-centric security architecture, to make progress towards a better control on sensitive data in distributed environments.
Conclusions
We believe that the joint usage of e-DSA management tools (like authoring and analysis tools) and suitable policy enforcement frameworks can help to make progress towards enabling users to have better control on their data once disclosed (e.g., in the Cloud) as well as increase the level of accountability of the various involved parties. The management of e-DSA described in this paper and the EnCoRe technical framework can support degrees of automation and policy enforcement. This is a first step towards addressing the automation problem. Our technologies can offer a support for users and organisations to fill the existing gap between stating policies and ensuring that they can be enforced by organisations.
To validate our vision and approach, we have currently developed the key technologies required for the management, deployment and enforcement of e-DSA within and across organisations. Some of these solutions have already been validated in a few case studies and collaborative UK and EU projects: the outcomes are encouraging and, at the same, enabled us to further understand the complexity of the problem.
A few key technical challenges still need to be fully addressed, including the deployment of the e-DSA management framework within an operational (cloud) environment, its integration with back-end solutions and its overall lifecycle management. Additional R&D work has to be carried out on improving the usability of the e-DSA authoring and analysis tools. In our view, these are key challenges that-in addition to more general trust and accountability issues-need to be fully addressed to enable the development of commercial solutions in this space.
